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For more than a century, political economists have sought to understand the nature of capital. 
The e ai i g i d  i  ha  he e  be e hi g ea   some productive capacity  that 
underpins capitalized values. This thinking, I argue, is a mistake. Building on Jonathan Nitzan 
and Shimshon Bich e  he  f ca i a  a  e , I a g e ha  ca i a i a i  i  a  ideology. It is 
a quantitative ritual for converting earnings into present value. Although the ritual is arbitrary, it 
gives rise to astonishing empirical regularities, reviewed here. 
  
 
The enigma of finance 
 
There is something mysterious about finance. The symbols are arcane. The math is complex. The 
practitioners are impressively educated. And the stakes are high. All of this gives finance the veneer of 
higher truth  as if quants (quantitative financial analysts) are uncovering a reality not accessible to the 
e  f . I  a e e he  a e. B  he ea i  i   ha   hi k. 
 
When you look at stock-market numbers, they do point to a truth about the world. But it is a truth not 
about natural law or human nature. It is a truth about human ideology. The reality is that finance is a 
quantitative belief system. At its center is a universal ritual  the ritual of capitalization. It is this ritual 
that underlies all stock-market numbers. 
 
In this essay, I explore the regularities that stem from the ritual of capitalization. They are astonishing 
in scope  a breathtaking consistency to human behavior. They beg the mind to look for some material 
basis for their existence. But that is a mistake. The reality is that the regularities of capitalization are an 
artifact of ideas  a manifestation of capitalist ideology itself. A regularity from ritual. 
 
 
Giving property a number 
 
The ritual of capitalization starts with the institutional act of exclusion  namely property.1 Property, of 
course, has a deep history that long predates capitalism. I will not wade into this history here. Instead, 
I will defer to Jean-Jacques Rous ea  cci c  (b  a c ha ) e i g f e  e e ge ce. 
Property arose when 
 
[ ]he fi  e  h , ha i g e c ed a  f a d, k i  i  hi  head  a  hi  
i  i e  a d f d e e i e e gh  be ie e hi   (R ea , 1992). 
 
 
1 Here is how Nitzan and Bichler describe the exclusionary act of property: The  i a  fea e f i a e 
ownership is not that it enables those who own, but that it disables those who do not. Technically, anyone can get 
i  e e e e  ca  a d d i e a a ,  gi e a  de   e  a  f Wa e  B ffe  ha e  i  Be k hi e Ha ha a . 
The sole purpose of private ownership is to prevent us from doing so. In this sense, private ownership is wholly 
and only an institution of exclusion, and institutional e c i  i  a a e  f ga i ed e  (Ni a  & Bich e , 
2009). 
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P i g a fe ce a d e hi g a d ca i g i  e  i  e  e f ca i a i a i n. But property 
alone is not enough. Romans had property. So did most feudal kingdoms. But these societies did not 
have capitalization. To capitalize property, there is a second step. You must mix property with finance. 
 
The d fi a ce  e ke  a e e f awe  a sense of other-worldly complexity. But at its heart, finance 
is simple. It is the act of reducing property to a number  a price. Merge property and finance, and you 
have capitalization. How this merger happened historically is complicated. But le  agai  ed ce hi  
to an apocryphal story. To paraphrase Rousseau: 
 
Having enclosed a plot of land, the first capitalist took it into his head to put a number 
on his property and found people simple enough to believe him. 
 
This act of giving property a number, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009) observe, is the 
central ritual of capitalism. It is the ritual of capitalization  a d i  c e  i h a b e . 
 
Beca e ca i a i a i  i  i e a  j  a i g be   e , a  be  is as good as the 
next one. My property could be a 23. It could also be a 1023. In other words, property can have any 
c cei ab e ice. B  hich ice i  c ec ? E e  i ce  a c ha  ca i a i   a be   
his property, capitalists have agonized e  hi  e i : ha  i  he true a e f  e ?  
 
Like so many human-created enigmas, the scientific answer is that the question has no meaning. 
De e i i g he e  a e f e  i  ike di c e i g he e  a e f he H  T i ity. It cannot 
be d e beca e he e i   bjec i e h   c e   there are only subjective human beliefs. The 
e a e  f he H  T i i  i  ha e e  ch ch c e g  defi e i   be. The a e h d  f  
ca i a i a i . The e a e  f e ty is whatever capitalists define it to be. 
 
This arbitrariness is why capitalists need a ritual. 
 
If you are going to answer unanswerable questions, there is no better way than through ritual. Think of 
a ritual as a mystified habit  a repetitive behavior that you reify with significance. As an example, take 
the ritual of gesturing the cross. It is a reified habit that Catholics use to symbolize both their faith in the 
Holy Trinity, and to remind them of how the Trinity has been defined (the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). 
 
Rituals are surprisingly powerful, especially when ingrained during youth. I will use myself as an 
example. During my childhood, my family went to a Catholic church, and I attended Catechism (Sunday 
school) weekly. I learned all the ritua  ha  a e a  f Ma . Af e  bei g c fi ed  a  a Ca h ic a  
age 13, however, I stopped going to church. Today I am an atheist who is skeptical of religion. Yet if I 
hea  he d  i  he a e f he Fa he , S , a d H  S i i , I ha e he ea -irresistible urge to 
gesture a cross. That is the power of ritual. 
 
Capitalists have invented a similar ritual, but it is not physical. It is mathematical. Faced with the desire 
 k  he e a e  f hei  e , ca i a i  ha e i e ed a f a ha  defi e  i . A e  
capitalized value is the discounted value of its future income: 
 
 
ca i a i ed a e
f e ea i g
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Looking at this equation, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler note something interesting. The 
formula ostensibly capitalizes property  the stuff that capitalists own. And yet the capitalization 
equation makes no mention of this stuff. There are no symbols for factories, machines, or infrastructure. 
Instead, there is only income (E). And that, Nitzan and Bichler observe, is precisely the point. The 
capitalization ritual tells us how capitalists see the world. Capitalists care not for the things they own. 
They care about their property rights  their right to earn income by putting up an (institutional) fence. 
 
Because it reflects an ideology, the capitalization formula is delightfully circular. It defines one monetary 
sum in terms of another. Nothing in science says that the equation should hold. It holds only because 
we have convinced ourselves that it should. 
 
As Nitzan and Bichler see it, the spread of capitalism boils down to the spread of the capitalization ritual. 
It allows anything and everything to have a capitalized value. Take music. In 2020, Bob Dylan sold his 
entire song catalogue to Universal for some $300 million (Sweney, 2020). The truth, though, is that 
Universal did not buy songs. It bought income. The c igh   D a  g  e ed a i ab e a a  
income  by some accounts about $4 million per year (Friedman, 2013). Assuming this sum is accurate, 








$300 i i  
 
 
Bob Dylan traded future income (from his property rights) for a lump sum. And Universal traded a lump 
sum for future income. That is capitalization in action. 
 
 
Regularity from ritual 
 
Unsurprisingly, rituals give rise to astonishing regularity. Every Sunday, Catholics gesture the cross. 
Five times a day, Muslims bow towards Mecca. Regularity from ritual. Like these religious rituals, the 
ec a  i a  f ca i a i a i  gi e  i e  a i hi g eg a i ie . Le  ha e a k a  he . 
 
We will start by noting that capitalization is defined only when property changes hands. Put another 
way, capitalized value is contested until property is sold. Take the example of Donald Trump. He 
proclaims constantly that his property is worth billion . C i ic  c e  ha  T  e i e i  h fa  
less. Neither side is correct. Capitalized value is undefined until the property is sold. If tomorrow, Trump 
sold his business for $1 billion, that would be its capitalized value. 
 
In the past, capitalization was poorly defined because property changed hands rarely. An aristocratic 
family, for instance, might run a merchant business for many generations without ever knowing its 
capitalized value. Today, things are different. That is because in modern capitalism, partial ownership 
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has become the norm. Portions of firms are bought and sold every second, which means we know 
capitalized value with exquisite detail. 
 
Take Amazon as an example. The business is enormous, employing about 1.2 million people. And yet 
the unit of ownership  the Amazon share  is minuscule. One Amazon share buys you about 2 billionths 
of the company. Because the unit of ownership is tiny, it is trivial to buy and sell. The result is that unlike 
aristocratic businesses that changed hands once a century, Amazon shares change hands every 
ec d. A  ch, A a  ca i a i ed a e i  k  e ac . A  f A g  12, 2021, i  a : 
 
 
A a  a ke  ca ha e ice be  f ha e





Why is Amazon capitalized at $1.68 trillion? The answer is that the company has a massive income 









$1.68 i i  
 
 
Next question. Where did the discount rate of 1.3% come from? The answer: out of thin air. Like the 
capitalization ritual itself, the discount rate is whatever we define it to be. Capitalists employ the 
capitalization ritual by ritualistic ch i g a di c  a e ha  he  dee  e . Ri a  i hi  i a . 
 
Yes, the whole endeavour smacks of arbitrariness. But that is the nature of ritual. What is important is 
the regularity to which the ritual gives rise. This regularity is not visible when looking at a single firm. It 
i   b  ki g a  h a d  f fi  ha   ca  ee i . O  ha  f , e    Fig e 1. 
 
I have plotted here data for the profit and capitalization of US public firms dating back to 1950. Each 
point is a firm in a given year. (There are about 200,000 observations in total.) From this sea of firms, 
the regularity of capitalization is unmistakable. Capitalization is proportional to profit discounted at a 
rate of 7%. Regularity from ritual. 
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Figure 1. Profit and capitalization of US firms, 1950  2017 
Each point represents a US firm. Color indicates the year of observation. The black line shows how 
capitalization relates to profits for a discount rate of 6.8%  the average found in the data. For data 




The discount rate 
 
Is there something special about the discount rate of 7%? The answer is yes and no. That rate is special 
i  he e e ha  US ca i a i  ha e dee ed i   be e . B  hi  a e i  ba a  i  he sense that it 
has no deeper meaning. US capitalists discount at 7% because that is the norm they have accepted. 
Gesture the cross. Discount at 7%. Regularity from ritual. 
How does this regularity come to exist? In the past, it was by decree. Much like church clergy decreed 
he a e f he H  T i i , he  dec eed he e  a e f di c : 
 
U i  he e e ge ce f ca i a i a i  i  he f ee h ce , [ he e  di c  
rate was] seen as a matter of state decree, sanctioned by religion and tradition, and 
modified by necessity. The nobility and clergy set the just lending rates as well as the 
tolerated zone of private divergence, and they often kept them fixed for very long 
e i d  f i e  (Ni a  & Bich e , 2009). 
 
T da , he e  di c nt rate still has an element of decree. Governments (via central banks) set 
the benchmark interest rate, which in turn affects the benchmark discount rate on equity. 
 
If you are a finance outsider, you may be wondering what the interest rate has to do with discounting. 
The two rates are related because the principle of capitalization is the reverse of the principle of interest. 
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Here is an example. Suppose you put $100 in your savings account at 5% interest. In a year, you would 
have $105. Now ask yourself  how much would you pay now to receive $105 in a year? The answer, 
if  a e a a i a  ca i a i , i  $100. Tha  i  he  ha  d ea  $5 he   i  a a i g  
account for a year. So by thinking about interest, you have capitalized a $5 future income at $100. 
 
Although the principle of discounting stems from the principle of interest, the two rates (benchmark 
discount and interest) are not the same. This we can see from history. But before we get to the data, 

















The ec d e a i  defi e  he effec i e  di c  a e a  hich i e  ca i a i e i c e. I ca  i  
he effec i e  a e beca e he ca i a i a i  i a  i  ech ica  ab  future income, which is unknown. 
In practice, capitalists pin down earnings E by looking at the recent past (i.e. the last quarterly income 
report). Assuming this habit, the effective discount rate is the ratio of present income and present 
capitalization. 
 
F  a a e ca c a i , e  e   A a . La  ea , he c a  aked i  $21 bi i  i  fi . 
And today, its market cap is about $1.68 trillion. So Amazon is currently capitalized at an effective 







$1680 bi i 0.013 
 
 
This effective discount rate varies between firms. And it varies within firms over time. This variation 
deserves a closer look. 
 
 
The benchmark discount rate 
 
We will start with the benchmark discount rate. I define this benchmark as the average of the effective 
discount rate across all firms. 
 
The math: to calculate the benchmark discount rate, we first take every public firm (with available data) 
and divide income by capitalization. That gives the effective discount rate for each firm in a given year. 
The benchmark rate is then the average across all firms in that year. (Because we are dealing with 
growth rates, I calculate the average using the geometric mean.) 
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Figure 2 shows how the US benchmark discount rate varied over the last 70 years. It oscillated around 
the average rate of 7%. But there are conspicuous departures from this average. In the mid 1970s, for 
instance, the benchmark rate soared to a high of 20%. What happened during this period? 
 
Figure 2. The US benchmark discount rate 
I have plotted here the trend in the average discount rate across all US firms in the Compustat 
databases. The dashed horizontal line is the average benchmark since 1950 (geometric mean, 




Given that the principle of capitalization works by reversing the principle of interest, one might think that 
the benchmark discount rate is a simple reflection of the rate of interest. If so, the discount-rate spike 
in the 1970s should correspond with an interest-rate hike. 
 
While reasonable, it turns out that this expectation is wrong. Figure 3 tells the story. Here I compare the 
benchmark discount rate to US interest rates. (I have used the US Federal Reserve interest rate  the 
so-ca ed effec i e fede a  f d  a e . Thi  i  he i e e  a e a  hich ba k  ade e  i h he 
Federal government. It sets the benchmark for all other interest rates.) 
 
We can see in Figure 3 that interest rates did spike in the past. But the hike came about 7 years after 
the spike in the discount rate. Clearly, then, interest rates are not driving how US capitalists discount 
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Figure 3. The US benchmark discount rate vs. the FED interest rate 
The blue line shows the trend in the average discount rate across all US firms in the Compustat 




While only loosely related to the rate of interest, it turns out that the benchmark discount rate is related 
to another rate: the rate of inflation (Fig. 4). The inflation rate is a measure of how rapidly prices tend to 
i e. Beca e ice cha ge a ie  b  c di , he e i   ch hi g a  the  a e f i f ation. Instead, 
think of inflation as similar to discounting: it has an average rate surrounded by a sea of deviation. 
 
The  c ehe i e ea e f he a e age a e f i f a i  i  ca ed he GDP def a . (I  
measures the average price change of all the commodities included in the calculation of GDP.) In Figure 
4, I compare this inflation rate to the benchmark discount rate. The two rates are clearly connected. 
When the benchmark discount rate spiked in the 1970s, so did the rate of inflation. 
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Figure 4. The benchmark US discount rate vs. inflation 
The blue line shows the trend in the average discount rate across all US firms in the Compustat 
databases. The red line shows the US GDP deflator, a measure of inflation. The inset plot shows the 




Why is the discounting benchmark related to inflation? In a word, uncertainty. Remember that 
capitalization is the ritual of putting a price on (unknown) future income. Capitalists make this leap of 
faith by assuming that present income will continue in perpetuity. But that is a risky assumption, 
especially when the social order is in turmoil. 
 
Back to inflation. Milton Friedman (1994) c ai ed ha  i f a i  i  a a  a d e e he e a 
e a  he e . Hi  ga  i  a ice a tology, since anything to do with prices automatically 
has to do with money. The actual science lies in what Friedman omitted. The reality is that inflation is 
always differential  some companies raise prices faster than others. That means inflation is always 
and everywhere a restructuring of the social order. It is a boon for some firms, but a bust for others. 
This is the inescapable conclusion reached by Jonathan Nitzan (1992) after an exhaustive look at the 
US data. 
 
Fa  e ha  j  a e a  he e , he , he i f a i  a e ig a  i abi i  i  he cia  
de . Tha  i abi i , i  ee , a a e  i  ca i a i  fea  ab  he f e. Whe  he ice e  
is more unstable, capitalists discount present income more steeply. 
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Le  back   a d k a  he he  c e   di c i g  deviation from the benchmark. 
Over the last 70 years, the average (effective) discount rate for US public firms was about 7%. But 
although the aggregate data shouts this value to us, few individual firms were capitalized at exactly this 
rate. This is because like all averages, the benchmark discount rate is a herd behavior that is visible 
only in aggregate. The effective discount rate for any single firm can vary widely. Le  ha e a k a  
this variation. 
 
Figure 5 plots the distribution of (effective) discount rates for every firm observation in my US dataset. 
The benchmark rate of 7% jumps out as a big central lump in the histogram. But do not be misled by 
the tidy bell curve. The horizontal axis here uses a logarithmic scale, which compresses variation. The 
reality is that some firms are discounted at rates of up to 1000%. And other firms are discounted at 
rates below 0.1%. That is variation over 4 orders of magnitude. Still, the vast majority of firms (about 
90%) are discounted at rates between 1.3% and 25%. 
 
Figure 5. The distribution of the effective discount rate among US firms 
I have plotted here the distribution of the effective discount rate for every US firm observation in the 
Compustat database. I calculate the discount rate by dividing annual profit by annual (closing) 
capitalization. The red line shows the geometric mean. The shaded region represents the 90% interval 
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Whenever we have variation, the next step is to look for its source. Why do some firms have a high 
(effective) discount rate and others a low one? It is here that things get interesting. Ostensibly, the 
capitalization ritual has a causal direction that flows from discounted earnings to capitalized value. 








There are instances where capitalization works in this simple way  but these instances are the 
exception, not the norm. The only time capitalization is so simple is when a firm is capitalized for the 
first time: during its initial public offering (IPO). Before an IPO, the firm opens up its books to let would-
be investors see the income stream. Using the capitalization ritual, the firm picks a share price for the 
launch. From the IPO onward, the stock price floats on the market. 
 
Aside from during an IPO, then, the capitalization ritual has an element of circularity. The ritual is 
ostensibly about capitalizing an income stream. Yet the most fully known quantity in the ritual is not 
income, but capitalized value itself. Y  ca  k  a c a  a ke  ca  d   he ec d. B  
c a , he fi  ea i g  ge  e ed 4 times a year. So what happens in practice is that investors 
capitalize income by keeping one eye on capitalization itself. The result is that the discount rate is 
circularly related to capitalization. 
 
Figure 6. The effective discount rate vs. capitalization among US firms 
The horizontal axis plots relative capitalization, normalized so that the median of the US Compustat 
sample in each year is 1. The vertical axis shows the corresponding discount rate, binned by 
capitalization. (Each point is the center of a bin.) For data sources, see Sources and methods. 
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Figure 6 shows the trend. Among US firms, the effective discount rate declines with capitalization. (Note 
that because I am comparing capitalization across years, I have normalized the data within each year 
so that the median capitalization in my firm sample is 1.) Around the median market cap, the discount 
rate is the same as the global benchmark of 7%. But as relative capitalization gets smaller than the 
median, the discount rate grows. And as relative capitalization gets larger than the median, the discount 
rate declines. It seems that US capitalists agree that small-cap investments are riskier than large-cap 
investments. Hence, they discount small-cap firms more heavily. 
 
I have so far portrayed the discount rate as a number that capitalists pull out of thin air. But this portrayal 
is only partially true. The absolute value of the discount rate is arbitrary, just as is the absolute value of 
capitalization. I can capitalize my property at 23 or 1023. In isolation, the difference is meaningless. 
Capitalization, however, does not happen in isolation. And that, Nitzan and Bichler observe, is the whole 
point. The only reason to have prices is to compare them to other prices. Hence, capitalization is 
meaningful only in relative terms. The same is true of the discount rate. 
 
The e a i e a e f he di c  a e a ifie  ca i a i  e ce i  f risk. The rationale again has 
to do with the capitalization ritual itself. The ritual is seemingly about quantifying the present value of 
future income. But the way capitalists calculate this value is to assume that present income continues 
indefinitely. That assumption is risky. And so capitalists try to bake future risk into their ritual. The more 
risk they perceive, the steeper they discount. 
How, then, do capitalists assess future risk? Like all elements of the capitalization ritual, capitalists look 
to the past.2 They assess future risk by looking at past risk. On that front, we can see that the decline 
in the discount rate with capitalization is not arbitrary. It is firmly grounded in the variability of past 
income. 
 
Figure 7 shows the trend. It is a bit complicated to interpret, so let me break down the analysis: 
 
1. I start with a firm  say General M . I he  ick a ea  ( a  1990) a d b e e GM  a ke  
cap; 
2. I k a  he ecedi g decade a d ea e he a iabi i  f GM  fi  e  ha  e i d (1981-
1990). I calculate the coefficient of variation of this profit (the standard deviation divided by the 
mean); 
3. I c e e he a e e a i  i  e e  ea  f  hich he e i  a ecedi g decade  h f 
data for GM; 
4. Repeat steps 1 3 for every firm in the dataset; 





2 F  a de ai ed di c i  f h  ca i a i  back a d-looking behavior relates to capitalization, see Bichler & 
Nitzan (2016). 
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Figure 7. Profit variability vs. capitalization among US firms 
I have analyzed profit variability (using the coefficient of variation) over a trailing 10-year window among 
firms grouped by capitalization. Each point on the blue line represents a market-cap bin. Note that I 






The results of this analysis, shown in Figure 7, indicate that the variability of past profit declines with 
relative capitalization. In other words, small-cap firms have more past risk than large-cap firms. If 
capitalists know this fact, then it is sensible to discount small firms more heavily than large firms. 
 
It is debatable, however, whether individual capitalists know much about the aggregate trend plotted in 
Figure 7. Instead, it is more likely that they rely on rules of thumb  e hi g ike e e ca i a  i  
more risky than blue-chi  ca i a . Thi  e he  ge  baked i  he ca i a i a i  i a  a  a b-ritual: 





C i i g he he e f i a  i hi  i a , e  k a  a he  a ec  f ca i a i a i : he markup. 
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According to this equation, there are two routes to more profit: 
 
1. increase sales (gross income); 
2. increase profit as a portion of sales (the markup). 
 
The two routes to profit are very different. When you increase sales alone, everyone gets more income 
in the same proportion. Wages and profits increase at the same rate, so their share of the pie remains 
constant. This is not true, however, when you increase profit using the markup. When you fatten the 
a k , a g ea e  i  f g  i c e g e   he fi  e , ea i g e  f  ke  (a d e  
for other firms). 
 
Looking at our basic capitalization equation, we can see that it says nothing about how profits are 
earned. All that matters is their size (net earnings, E). But when investors apply the capitalization ritual, 
it turns out that they have a profit preference. Investors prefer to capitalize a high markup. 
 
Figure 8. Markup vs. capitalization among US firms 
I ha e a a ed fi  a k  a g fi  g ed b  ca i a i a i . Each i   he b e i e 
represents a market-cap bin. The vertical axis shows the markup. Note that I have normalized 
capitalization so that the median in each year is 1. For data sources, see Sources and methods. 
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Figure 8 shows the trend. I have plotted here the markup as a function of relative capitalization among 
all US public firms (since 1950). Each point indicates the median markup when firms are grouped by 
relative market cap. (I have normalized capitalization so that the median cap in each year is 1). It is 
easy to spot the trend. The markup grows reliably with capitalization. When US investors capitalize 
income, it seems they prefer that profit be reaped on a fat margin. 
 
Why do investors award greater capitalization to firms with a higher markup? Perhaps it again comes 
down to perceptions of risk. Consider two companies with similar-sized profits. One company has 
mammoth sales but a razor thin markup. The other company has smaller sales, but a fat markup. Which 
e d  i e  dee  e i k , a d  di c  e ee ? 
 
To make the question concrete, consider the difference between Walmart and Apple, summarized in 
Table 1. In order-of-magnitude terms, the two firms have similar-sized profits. But they take different 
routes to this windfall. Walmart has enormous sales and a thin markup. Apple has smaller sales and a 
fat markup. 
 
Table 1. Walmart vs. Apple 
  Walmart Apple 
Profit (billions $) 21 57 
Sales (billions $) 520 275 
Markup 4.0% 20.9% 
Capitalization (billions $) 400 2127 
Effective discount rate 5.1% 2.7% 
Sources: Walmart 2020 Annual Report, Apple 2020 Annual Report. 
 
I e , i  ee , efe  he A e e  fi . E e  h gh A e  fi  i  f i i a  i e  
Wa a , i e  e a d A e i h fa  e ca i a i a i . The diffe e ce? Wa a  ha  a hi  
markup, Apple a fat one. 
 
Framed in terms of the capitalization ritual, investors discount Walmart more steeply than Apple. They 
obviously have reasons for doing so, but these reasons need not be objective. That is because we are 
dealing with an ideological Russian doll  rituals within rituals within rituals. 
 
 
The finance ethos 
 
A ba ic i ci e f he ga i  f ide g  i  ha   h d a k  ide g  a bi a  
elements. Faith in your ideology hinges on it having the appearance of higher truth. You must therefore 
avoid plain discussion at all costs, since it has the unfortunate effect of shedding light on the 
arbitrariness of your ideas. 
 
And so it is with capitalization. Finance textbooks read like tomes of physics, bombarding the reader 
with opaque symbols and complex equations. The mathematics give capitalization the appearance of 
cie ific h . D e  hi  ea  ha  fi a ce i  a ha d cie ce ? 
 
The answer is a hard no. 
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Finance does not describe our social world. Finance defines it. Finance outlines the rituals whereby 
capitalists impose order onto society, turning the qualities of ownership into a single quantity. Finance, 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler observe, is the ideology of our time: 
 
The cie ce f fi a ce  i  fi  a d f e  a collective ethos. Its real achievement is 
not objective discovery but ethical articulation. Taken together, the models of finance 
constitute the architecture of the capitalist nomos. In a shifting world of nominal mirrors 
and pecuniary fiction, this nomos provides capitalists with a clear, moral anchor. It fixes 
the underlying terrain, it shows them the proper path to follow, and it compels them to 
stay on track. Without this anchor, all capitalists  whether they are small, anonymous 
day traders, legendary investors such as Warren Buffet, or professional fund managers 
like Bill Gross  would be utterly lost. 
 
Finance theory establishes the elementary particles of capitalization and the 
boundaries of accumulation. It gives capitalists the basic building blocks of investment; 
i  e  he  h   a if  he e e i ie  a  e ica  a iab e ; a d i  ide  he  
with a universal algorithm that reduces these variables into the single magnitude of 
present value. Although individual capitalists differ in how they interpret and apply 
these principles, few if any can transcend their logic. And since they all end up obeying 
he a e ge e a  e , he e  he e e  ee  bjec i e  a d he ef e a e ab e 
 cie ific di c e  (Ni a  & Bich e , 2009). 
 
Make no mistake, the regularities of corporate finance are majestic in scope. But these regularities stem 
not from any laws of nature. They are regularities from ritual. Gesture the cross. Discount present 
income. 
 
Perhaps the most important question is where this ritual is headed. Does capitalization have a long-
term future? Neoclassical economists like William Nordhaus (2007) think so. He is happy to apply the 
capitalization ritual to existential crises like climate change. And the net present value of his calculations 
tells him that we should do essentially nothing. But of course, by applying a heavy discount rate to 
f e i c e, d i g hi g  i  ha  N dha  a ed i  he fi  ace. I  i  i a i ed a a h .3 
 
Back to the present. The ritual of ca i a i a i  i  ded b  a i e f highe  h . Whe e e  
you encounter such a mystique, it is a good bet that you are dealing with ideology. The point of the 
i e  i     f  ki g de  he ide g  h d. Whe   d ,  ee that the whole 
hi g i  a h e f ca d . The highe  h  f he H  T i i  i  ha  i  i  a  ide gica  i e i  f 
ch ch c e g . S   i h fi a ce. The  diffe e ce i  ha  i h fi a ce, he c e g  a e  ie   
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3 F  a deb ki g f N dha  c i a e-change work, see Keen (2020). For a discussion of how Nordhaus uses 
the capitalization ritual to discount future income, see Bichler & Nitzan (2018). 
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Sources and methods 
 
All data and code for the analysis in this paper are available at the Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/vm4by/ 
 
Financial data for US firms comes from Compustat. Data series are as follows: 
 capitalization: number of shares outstanding (series CSHO) × annual closing share price (series 
PRCC_C) 
 profit (net income): series NI 
 sales: series SALE 
 markup (profit as a portion of sales): NI / SALE 
Interest rates (Fig. 3) are from FRED series DFF. The GDP deflator (Fig. 4) is from FRED series 
A191RI1Q225SBEA 
 
The effective discount rate 
 









where 𝐸𝑓 i  he fi  fi  a d 𝐾𝑓 i  he fi  ca i a i a i  (i  a gi e  ea ). I defi e he a e age 
discount rate for all firms, 𝑟, as the geometric mean of 𝑟𝑓 over all firms: 
 
 
𝑟 𝑟1𝑟2 ⋅⋅⋅ 𝑟 1/  
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